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Abstract 
The insufficient understanding of the credit network structure was recognized as a key factor for 
regulators’ underestimation of the destructive systematic risk during the financial crisis that started 
in 2007. The existing credit network research either took a macro perspective to clarify the 
topological properties of financial systems at a descriptive level, or analyzed the risk transmission 
path and characteristics of individual entities with much pre-assumptions of the network. Here, we 
used the theory of complex network to model China’s credit system from 2000 to 2014 based on 
actual financial data. A bipartite financial institution-firm network and its projected sub-networks 
were constructed for an integrated analysis from both macro and micro perspectives, and the 
relationship between typological properties and systematic credit risk control was also explored. 
The typological analysis of the networks suggested that the financial institutions and firms were 
highly but asymmetrically connected, and the credit network structure made local idiosyncratic 
shocks possible to proliferate through the whole economy. In addition, the Chinese credit market 
was still dominated by state-owned financial institutions with firms competing fiercely for 
financial resources in the past fifteen years. Furthermore, the credit risk score (CRS) was 
introduced by simulation to identify the systematically important vertices in terms of systematic 
risk control. The results indicated that the vertices with more access to the credit market or less 
likelihood to be a bridge in the network were the ones with higher systematically importance. The 
empirical results from this study would provide specific policy suggestions to financial regulators 
on supervisory approaches and optimizing allocation of regulatory resources to enhance the 
robustness of credit systems in China and in other countries.  
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1.  Introduction  
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In the financial crisis that started in 2007, the defaults and losses of some individual banks were 
magnified rapidly through the credit network among financial institutions to the entire financial 
marketing, leading to a dramatic impact to the whole economy. The after-event analysis regarded 
the insufficient understanding of the credit network structure as a key factor for regulators’ 
underestimation of the destructive systematic risk (Brunnermeier, 2008). In response to the crisis, 
the FSB (Financial Stability Board) together with BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision) have published a series of important documents to manage systematic risks, such as 
Global Systemically Important Banks: Updated Assessment Methodology and the Higher Loss 
Absorbency Requirement. In China, the China Financial System Stability Assessment (2012) 
compiled by World Bank and the People’s Bank of China suggested that the Chinese financial 
system has become more vulnerable to systemic risk than before. For effective control of the 
systematic risk, while the correlations among financial institutions have become increasingly 
strengthened and complicated, the understanding of the financial networks’ typological properties 
and the risk transmission path would be of great use for policy suggestion.  
The network analysis has been increasingly used in finance area to research financial networks 
and their dynamic evolution procedure in recent years. Integrating micro and macro perspectives, 
the analysis regards the agents in the economy as vertices, and the mutual relations among agents 
as edges, based on which large-scale complex networks are constructed. The existing network 
research in finance field is generally of two strains. The first one concentrates on clarifying the 
typological structure of the financial network (Iori et al., 2008；Cajueiro and Tabak, 2008；Boss et 
al., 2004). Due to data availability, most of the research modelled and analyzed the inter-bank 
market risk exposure and managed to figure out some typical complex network properties of 
financial networks. However, most of those research was still stuck in the statistical description of 
the network, with little concern about the impact of the typological properties on financial risk 
control. In addition, the majority of the networks only include one kind of vertices representing 
financial institutions. Bipartite networks including two kinds of vertices, such as banks and firms, 
were rarely constructed. For the second strain of the research, network analysis was used to 
explore the transmission path of financial risk and to identify the important financial entity with 
systemic significance (Upper, 2011；Hasman and Samartin, 2008). Many of those studies assumed 
that the financial network is a regular network or a random work, and some important 
characteristics of the actual financial work, such as scale-free and hierarchy properties, were 
ignored. Those ignorance would limit the external validity of the conclusions and the practical 
values to some extent. Besides, these studies mainly focused on the systematic significance of  
individual vertices, missing the impact of the network typological properties on systematic 
stability.  
This study constructed a bipartite network based on actual financial transaction data to analyze the 
typological properties and transmission procedure for effective risk management. In this network, 
two kinds of vertices, financial institutions and listed firms, were included, which was rarely 
constructed in previous studies. In addition, the typological properties and risk transmission were 
examined in details. The time length of this study is fifteen years, which allowed us to evaluate the 
relationship between the evolution of network structure and the evolution of financial risk from a 
dynamic perspective. In addition, this study is based in China, the largest emerging country. It 
would add an important sample to the existing research, which was mainly developed countries 
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based, for risk management in home and international market. 
2.  Data and Methodology  
2.1  The data 
This study used the credit data of listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 
2000 to 2014, which were drawn from CSMAR database, a leading financial database in China. 
The data was extracted with focus on the credit information between listed firms and financial 
institutions, including names of debtors and creditors, loan amount and currency. To ensure the 
validity and reliability of research, the original data was pre-processed: 1) excluding firms with no 
credit history; 2) excluding transactions without creditor or debtor information ; 3) excluding 
transactions without loan amount; 4) excluding listed firms under special treatment; 5) 
regularizing names of financial institutions. After the pre-treatment, we got 607 financial 
institutions, 1,777 listed firms and 23,133 loan records. Referring to the financial institutions 
classification standard by CBRC (China Bank Regulatory Commission), financial institutions 
were divided into 1) state-owned commercial banks; 2) policy banks; 3) nationwide joint-stock 
banks; 4) urban commercial bank and urban credit cooperatives; 5) rural cooperative bank and 
rural credit cooperatives; 6) foreign banks; 7) trust and financial firms. Among them, the number 
of trust and financial firms was the largest 246, 40.53% of the total institutions. The largest 
amount of loans were provided by large state-owned commercial banks, which was 2,152.176 
billion yuan, 45.68% of the total amount. In accordance with the Guidance for Industry 
Classification of Listed Firms (2012 revised edition) issued by CSRC (China Securities 
Regulatory Commission), this study classified the industries of all the firms. The real estate 
development and operation industry has the largest number of the loan records and the largest 
amount of money, which was 1,996 and 80,308.68 million yuan respectively. For this industry, 
8.63% of the loan records contributed to 11.56% loan amount, suggesting that important status of 
real estate industry in China. Figure 1 shows the changes in credit amount, number of financial 
institutions and firms in from 2000 to 2014. All the three indicators generally followed an 
increasing trend, while two twisted points could be seen in year 2006 and 2011.  
 
2.2  Construction of Financial Institution-Firm network and One-Mode Projections  
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This study regards the credit market in China as a complex network. It is composed by a 
considerable number of financial institutions and firms as vertices, and connected by the credit 
relationships as edges. In this network, there are two kinds of vertices, financial institutions and 
firms, and the edges run only between vertices of unlike types, credit flow from financial 
institutions to firms. This type of network is called bipartite network or two-mode network, a 
special model in graph theory. Due to the special characteristics of bipartite networks, two 
one-mode projections can be created from the two-mode bipartite form. Because the information 
provided by the network based on two-mode data is quite different from the networks based on 
one-mode projections, both the two-mode and one-mode networks are usually analyzed jointly for 
better understanding (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). In our study, the credit network based on 
two-mode data (financial institutions and firms) provides the information about the direction of 
credit flow across different industries or regions and the interdependent relationship between the 
financial institutions and firms, implying the possible contagion path and severity of financial 
crisis. For the projected credit sub-networks with one-mode data (financial institutions or firms) 
provides the information about the competition structure for high quality credit and risk-sharing 
mechanism among different financial institutions or firms, thus implying the hierarchical structure 
of the credit market and outlining those most crucial players. Both the bipartite network and the 
projected networks would be analyzed in this study. 
Based on the credit data among financial institutions and firms, an undirected and unweighted  
network, and an weighted network were constructed respectively. As for the undirected and 
unweighted network, the adjacency matrix of t time period is the matrix with elements 𝑎𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡  
such that①: 
𝑎𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡 = {
  1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗 
𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒；
 
For the weighted network, the adjacency matrix of t time period is the matrix with elements 
𝑤𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡  such that: 
𝑤𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡 = {
  > 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖
 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
= 0, 𝑛𝑜 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖
𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑗 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
 
Based on the adjacency matrix and weighted adjacency matrix of financial institution-firm 
network and the characteristics of bipartite network, financial institution-financial institution 
network and firm-firm network could be projected. For financial institution-financial institution 
network, the adjacency matrix of time period t is the matrix with elements 𝑎𝐵𝐵(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡  (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) such 
that: 
𝑎𝐵𝐵(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡 = {
  1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡   
𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒；
 
                                                             
① In all the matrixes in this study, financial institutions are denoted as B, while firms are denoted as F. 
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Similarly, for firm-firm network, the adjacency matrix of time period t is the matrix with elements 
𝑎𝐹𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡  (𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) such that: 
𝑎𝐹𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡 = {
  1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑗 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚  𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒   
 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
0, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒；
 
In summary, for each time period, we can get two kinds of matrixes. One describes the credit 
relationship between financial institutions and firms, including an unweighted and a weighted 
matrix. The other one, projected from the bipartite, describes the relationship among financial 
institutions or firms. All these matrixes and the relationship among the entities provided basis for 
our empirical study. 
 
3.  Analysis of Typological Properties of Financial Institution-Firm Network 
3.1  Degree and Strength Distribution  
In complex network theory, vertex degree and strength describes the heterogeneity of vertex at 
individual level (Almaas et al.，2004). In financial institution-firm network, the degree of a 
financial institution vertex describes the number of firms it provided loans to. The degree of a firm 
vertex describes the number of financial firms it received loans from. The strength of a vertex 
describes the total amount of loans a financial institution provided or a firm received. The vertex 
degree and strength complements with each other to analyze how individual entities interact with 
each other from a micro perspective.  
In t period, the degree and strength of financial institution vertices and firm vertices are defined as 
follows: 
𝑁𝐷𝐵𝑖
𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡
𝐽
；𝑁𝐷𝐹𝑗
𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡
𝐼
                                                 (1) 
𝑁𝑆𝐵𝑖
𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡
𝐽
；𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑖
𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡
𝐼
                                                 (2) 
The time-evolution of degree and strength for financial institution-firm network conveyed that 
China has experienced a national credit expansion during the last fifteen years. The figure 2 shows 
that the average degree of each financial institution was volatile before 2006, and it was followed 
by a twisted upward. The average degree of each firm followed a steep increase from about 1.5 to 
a peak of 6.16. The figure 3 shows that vertex strength witnessed a similar trend. A sharp lifting 
after 2012 was observed for both financial institutions and firms  
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The semi-parameter estimation introduced by Clauset et al. (2014) was applied to analyze the 
degree and strength of vertices (see figure 4 and 5). The results showed that the distribution of 
degree and strength for both financial institutions and firms followed a power-law distribution, 
indicating that the financial institution-firm network was a typical scale-free network. Meanwhile, 
it was evident that the exponents of the fitted power-law distributions (degree and strength) of 
financial institutions displayed a lower level than those of firms.  
   
In figure 6 and 7, we show the scaling of the strength versus the degree. In the case of financial 
institutions, the linear correlation coefficient between strengths and degrees is 0.8906 (p<0.001), 
while that for firms is 0.3183 (p<0.001). The correlation coefficient of financial institutions was 
higher than firms. It was mainly because financial institutions has much stronger need for risk 
diversification. To assure the safety of loans, financial institutions tend to spread large amounts of 
loans among many different firms. For the firms, the relationship between the amount of loans 
firms demand for and the number of financial institutions they ask to was positive but relatively 
weak. The reason is that the firms with large amount of loans prefer to borrow from many 
different resources (Ogawa et al., 2007). However, firms with a smaller amount of loans may also 
prefer multiple links. In addition, when firms borrow from many financial institutions, it does not 
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Figure 2  The Average Degree of Financial 
Institutions and Firms (2000-2014)
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Figure 3  The Average Strength of Financial 
Institutions and Firms (2000-2014)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
E
st
im
a
te
d
 E
x
p
o
n
e
n
t
Year
Financial Institutions Firms
Figure 4  The Exponents of Fitted Power-law
Distributions for Degrees Distribution (2000-2014)
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Figure 5  The Exponents of Fitted Power-law
Distributions for Strengths Distribution (2000-2014)
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mean that they must be seeking considerable amounts of loans. Instead, they may desire to have 
cooperation with different resources for better financing support in the future, which is especially 
true in China's financing environment.  
   
 
3.2  Distribution of Relative Vertex Strength  
The relative vertex strength is introduced to measure to what extent the financial institutions and 
firms are interdependent with each other in the network. The dependence of firm j on financial 
institution i is defined as the share of credit amount it receives from i in its total liabilities. 
Similarly, the dependence of financial institution i on firm j is defined as the share of credit to j in 
its total lending. Hence, the relative strength increases with the relative importance of the financial 
institution as a creditor or firm as debtor. The relative strength for financial institution i and firm j 
t time period is defined respectively as: 
𝑅𝑁𝑆𝐵𝑖
𝑡 = ∑ (𝑤𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡
𝐼
⁄ )
𝐽
                                                 (3) 
𝑅𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑖
𝑡 = ∑ (𝑤𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡 ∑ 𝑤𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑡
𝐽
⁄ )
𝐼
                                                 (4) 
In figure 8, we show that the relative strength of financial institutions fluctuated before 2006. It 
was followed by a remarkable plummeting from the peak of 0.3155 to 0.0891, while those of 
firms were stable at much lower level around 0.01. The analysis shows that the financial 
institutions generally held a relatively dominant positions in the credit relationships in China. 
Because of insufficient financial resources and risk aversion, small and medium sized firms were 
in relatively weak positions. In addition, due to the great influence of Chinese government policies, 
whether a firm can receive loans is also affected by policies, which also partly explain the low 
relative strength of firms. The table 1 shows that the relative strength of state-owned commercial 
banks was ranked first for 13 years out of 15 years, which suggested the prominent position in 
China's financial system. Policy banks were also ranked first in 2005 and 2006, which indicated 
the strong macro-control of Chinese government in this time period. For top ranked industries, 
manufacturing industries and energy-related industries were most frequently listed. From 2008 to 
2014, cement manufacturing industries were ranked first for 4 times, which indicated the rapid 
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development of infrastructure and construction. The Chinese economy was still largely driven by 
infrastructure development and real estate.  
 
Table 1  The Top Ranking of Relative Strength for Financial Institutions and Firms (2000-2014) 
Year Type of Financial Institutions RS Industry of Firms RS 
2000 State-owned commercial banks 0.6221 Non-ferrous metal ore mining 0.0588 
2001 State-owned commercial banks 0.4954 Transportation subsidiary service 0.0302 
2002 State-owned commercial banks 0.7215 Information dissemination service 0.0206 
2003 State-owned commercial banks 1.0067 Rubber manufacturing 0.0578 
2004 State-owned commercial banks 1.5008 Metal products 0.0401 
2005 Policy banks 2.5240 
Wholesale of energy, materials, 
machinery and electronic equipment 
0.0370 
2006 Policy banks 2.2656 Medicine manufacturing 0.0490 
2007 State-owned commercial banks 0.5688 
Instrument, meter, stationery and office 
machine manufacturing 
0.0314 
2008 State-owned commercial banks 1.1468 Cement manufacturing 0.0151 
2009 State-owned commercial banks 0.9746 Cement manufacturing 0.0197 
2010 State-owned commercial banks 0.6831 
Other electronic equipment 
manufacturing 
0.0088 
2011 State-owned commercial banks 0.8843 Cement manufacturing 0.0103 
2012 State-owned commercial banks 0.7463 Cement manufacturing 0.0116 
2013 State-owned commercial banks 0.9541 Coal mining and dressing  0.0040 
2014 State-owned commercial banks 0.9201 Other public facilities services 0.0049 
 
3.3  The Community Structure and Its Membership 
This section explores the regional network properties of the financial institution-firm network by 
conducting community detection. One network may be partitioned into different communities, 
with many edges connecting vertices in the same community and few connecting vertices among 
different ones (Fortunato, 2010). If the financial institution-firm network is completely connected, 
where any pair of financial institutions and firms has an equal chance to be linked, no conspicuous 
community structure would be expected. Otherwise, a remarkable number of communities may be 
detected. The community detection method introduced by Newman and Girvan (2004) to inspect 
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Figure 8  The Relative Strength of Financial Institutions and Firms (2000-2014)
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the possible existence of communities in the network. Specifically, the modularity function of 
financial institution-firm network to be optimized is defined as: 
ℚ =
1
2𝑀
∙ ∑[𝑎𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗) − 𝑎𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑒 ] ∙ 𝛿(𝑐𝑖 , 𝑐𝑗)
𝑖𝑗
                                                 (5) 
Where 𝑎𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗) is the corresponding element of its unweighted adjacency matrix, and 𝑎𝐵𝐹(𝑖,𝑗)
𝑒  is 
the probability of the presence of an edge between the t vertex 𝑖 and 𝑗 in the randomized null 
model. 𝑀 is the total number of existing edges, while the 𝛿(𝑐𝑖 , 𝑐𝑗) is the indication function 
deciding the community membership: 𝛿(𝑐𝑖 , 𝑐𝑗) equals 1 if the two vertex 𝑖 and 𝑗 are in the 
same community and 0 otherwise. The Newman-Girvan community detection algorithm shows a 
general picture of community structure at network-level. The next step of our study is to seek for 
information characterizing the obtained communities and their periodic evolution.  
Table 2 listed the community detection results from 2000 to 2014. The number of the communities 
gradually rose from 10 to 36 with the two-year trough in 2003 and 2004, while the percentage of 
the largest community stabilized around 85% to 95% except for 69.57% in 2000. The fact that 
89.98% of the network were connected together on average from 2000 to 2014 meant that the 
financial institution-firm network was a highly connected network. From the risk management 
prospective, such a community structure displayed the vulnerability to systematic financial risk. It 
indicated that the default risk burst from any given vertex could potentially spread among most of 
the vertices with unlimited cascades and feedback loop in a very short time (Haldane and May, 
2011). Moreover, Table 2 summarized the most representative entity types, which had the largest 
amount of credits, in the largest community each year. It was noticed that the most representative 
type of the financial institutions was 'state-owned commercial banks' for the majority of the years. 
As for the firms, 'real estate development and operation' was identified as the most representative 
industry in nine out of fifteen years, and several manufacturing industries were ranked first from 
2003 to 2008. In summary, while state-owned commercial banks played a dominant role in the 
largest community almost throughout the whole time period, the prominent industry changed from 
time to time. One interesting fact could be observed that the representative industry from 2008 to 
2012 was real estate development and operation industry for four consecutive years, which 
indicated the large credit flows to this industry. It also provided a perspective to look at the highly 
disputed real estate industries in China.  
Table 2  Summary of Information about the Largest Community (2000-2014) 
Year 
Number of 
Communities 
Percentage of the 
Largest Community 
Representative Type of 
Financial Institution 
Representative Industry 
of Firms 
2000 10 69.57% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Real estate development 
and operation 
2001 12 98.39% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Real estate development 
and operation 
2002 8 94.07% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Real estate development 
and operation 
2003 4 97.00% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Chemical material and 
products manufacturing 
2004 4 97.18% State-owned Electric power, steam and hot 
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commercial banks water production and supply 
2005 8 82.22% Policy bank 
Daily use electronic 
equipment manufacturing 
2006 7 72.31% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Real estate development 
and operation 
2007 16 88.38% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Electric power, steam and hot 
water production and supply 
2008 14 93.62% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Daily use electronic 
equipment manufacturing 
2009 23 91.87% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Real estate development 
and operation 
2010 28 89.17% 
Nationwide joint-stock 
bank 
Real estate development 
and operation 
2011 24 91.40% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Real estate development 
and operation 
2012 28 93.93% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Real estate development 
and operation 
2013 27 95.57% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Civil engineering works 
construction 
2014 36 95.05% 
State-owned 
commercial banks 
Real estate development 
and operation 
 
 
4.  The Analysis of the Topological Properties of Institution-Institution Network and 
Firm-Firm Network 
From the analysis of topological properties of financial institution-firm network, we found that the 
financial institutions and firms were highly connected as indicated by the community structure, 
and asymmetrically connected, as indicated by the degree and strength distribution. It also implied 
that the local idiosyncratic shocks such as default risk were possible to proliferate through the 
whole economy and generate a sizable global disturbance. The projected credit sub-networks with 
only one-mode data provide the information from a supplementary perspective. As for the 
projected credit sub-networks based only on the financial institutions (institution-institution 
network), two connected institutions means that they offered credits to at least one common firm,. 
Both institutions jointly undertook the potential default risk of the common firm. For the 
sub-network based only on the firms (firm-firm network), two connected firms means that they 
received credits from at least one common financial institution. The two firms competed for 
credits. The topological properties analysis of the sub-networks shed some lights on the intensity 
and structure of the default risk sharing mechanism among different financial institutions, and 
competition among firms to obtain the credit. The clustering coefficient and the assortativity 
coefficient would be adopted for this analysis, where the former one provides insights on how 
dense the financial institutions were risk-shared or the firms competed with each other, and the 
later one indicated the interdependent mechanism. 
The clustering coefficient measures the probability that two financial institutions or firms are 
connected with each other. The higher the clustering coefficient is, the more dense the 
sub-networks is. The clustering coefficient of is defined as: 
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𝐶𝐶𝔾 =
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝔾(𝑖)𝑖
𝑁
                                                 (6) 
Where 𝐶𝐶𝔾(𝑖) is the individual clustering coefficient of vertex 𝑖
①, which is defined as: 
𝐶𝐶𝔾(𝑖) =
# {𝑗𝑘|𝑘 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝔾(𝑖), 𝑘 ∈ 𝑁𝔾(𝑖)}
𝑑𝔾(𝑖)(𝑑𝔾(𝑖) − 1)/2
                                                 (7) 
Here, 𝑁 is the number of vertex, and 𝑑𝔾(𝑖) is the degree of vertex 𝑖. 𝑑(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) equals to the 
shortest path length between vertex 𝑖 and 𝑗, and we further assume if vertex 𝑖 and 𝑗 are 
unconnected then 𝑑(𝑣𝑖 , 𝑣𝑗) equals 0. 
The assortativity coefficient measures the level of homophyly of the network, based on some 
vertex labeling or values assigned to vertices, such as degree. If the vertices show high tendencies 
to establish the link with other nodes that have similar (or dissimilar) scale of degrees as 
themselves, then the network is labeled as assortativity (or disassortativity) with a positive (or 
negative) assortativity coefficient (Newman, 2003). The assortativity coefficient is defined as: 
𝑟𝔾 =
1
|𝐷𝔾|
∙ ∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑘𝑗 − [
1
|𝐷𝔾|
∙ ∑
1
2 ∙ (𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑗)]
2
1
|𝐷𝔾|
∙ ∑
1
2 ∙ (𝑘𝑖
2 + 𝑘𝑗
2) − [
1
|𝐷𝔾|
∙ ∑
1
2 ∙ (𝑘𝑖 + 𝑘𝑗)]
2                                                  (8) 
Where |𝐷𝔾| is the number of existing edges in the network, and 𝑘𝑖 and 𝑘𝑗 are the degrees of 
vertex 𝑖 and 𝑗 respectively. 
 
                                                             
① If the degree of vertex i is no more than 1, the 𝐶𝐶𝔾(𝑖) is set to 0. 
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Figure 9  The Clustering Coefficient of Two Projected Credit Subgraphs (2000-2014)
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As for the institution-institution network, the clustering coefficient increased from 2001 to 2005, 
but it was followed by a decline since 2006. Meanwhile, the clustering coefficient of firm-firm 
network stabilized above 0.6 in the shape of an U. We interpret this as a clear signal of a 
long-standing credit market, where firms need to compete fiercely with other counterparties for a 
superior credit. The similar shaped behaviors were also observed in the assortativity coefficient. 
Figure 10 showed that the assortativity coefficients of the institution-institution network were all 
negative and experienced a rapid descent after 2006, while that of the firm-firm network were 
almost negative except for the first two years and fluctuated within a certain band between 0.2 and 
-0.1. These results suggested the disassortativity of both sub-networks. It implied that the firms 
tended to demand loans from large and small financial institutions simultaneously, and at the same 
time, the financial institutions preferred to cultivate the credit portfolio including the firms in 
various industries. A possible explanation is that the main players in the credit market before 2006 
were the state-owned commercial banks, policy banks and nationwide joint-stock banks (called 
nationally-operated institutions), whose branches were distributed nationally, hence having more 
opportunities to offer the credit to one common firm. After 2006, the booming credit demands 
were hardly met only by those nationally-operated institutions. More and more urban commercial 
bank and urban credit cooperatives, rural cooperative bank and rural credit cooperatives, foreign 
banks and trust and financial firms (called locally-operated institutions) participated in the market. 
Due to the limited resources, and political and geographical constraints, the locally-operated 
institutions could only make the credit available to limited firms or in a limited area. Hence they 
were sparsely linked with the locally-operated institutions elsewhere and further stifled the 
excessive relationships. Figure 11 and 12 shows the change of the percentage of number and 
amount of credit provided by nationally-operated institutions from 2000-2014. The gradual 
downward trends were in supportive of the upsurge of the appearance of the locally-operated 
institutions in the credit market. 
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Figure 10  The Assortativity Coefficient of Two Projected Credit Subgraphs (2000-2014)
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5.  Identification of Systematically Important Vertices in Credit Network 
5.1  Construction of Credit Risk Score 
An important purpose of analyzing the topological properties of credit network is to identify the 
entities of significantly systematic influence, which may potentially spread risks hastily to the 
whole system. Here we introduced feedback centrality (Galbiati et al.，2013) to construct credit 
risk score, CRS. The CRS measures the potential influence of an entity, either a financial 
institution or a firm, to others when a credit default occurs in this entity. The greater the score is , 
the more important this entity is for systematic stability. The entity with high CRS score are the 
key vertex for risk control.  
First of all, the confronted risk of a financial institution and the confronted risk of a firm are 
defined as 𝛾𝑏  and 𝛾𝑓  respectively. 𝛾𝑏  and 𝛾𝑓  ranges from 0 meaning completely healthy 
assets, to 1 meaning bankruptcy. It is supposed that in t period, only the ith financial institution 
went bankrupt, all the other financial institutions and firms are healthy, i.e., 𝛾𝐵𝑖
𝑡 = 1、𝛾𝐵𝑗|𝑗≠𝑖
𝑡 = 0、
𝛾𝐹𝑘
𝑡 = 0. In accordance with feedback centrality algorithm, the risk of all the entities in the t+1 
period is as follows: 
𝛾𝐵𝑖
𝑡+1 = 1                                                                                           (9) 
𝛾𝐵𝑗|𝑗≠𝑖
𝑡+1 = 𝛾𝐵𝑗|𝑗≠𝑖
𝑡 + ∑ 𝑤𝐵𝑖𝐹𝑘 ∙ 𝛾𝐹𝑘
𝑡+1
𝐾
                                         (10) 
𝛾𝐹𝑘
𝑡+1 = 𝛾𝐹𝑘
𝑡 + ∑ 𝑤𝐹𝑘𝐵𝑖 ∙ 𝛾𝐵𝑗
𝑡+1
𝐽
                                                 (11) 
𝑤𝐵𝑖𝐹𝑘、𝑤𝐹𝑘𝐵𝑖is defined as elements of risk diffusion matrix P, such that 
𝑤𝐵𝑖𝐹𝑘 =
𝐶𝐵𝑖𝐹𝑘
𝐶𝐵𝑖
，  𝑤𝐹𝑘𝐵𝑖 =
𝐶𝐵𝑖𝐹𝑘
𝐶𝐹𝑘
 
𝐶𝐵𝑖𝐹𝑘measures the credit strength between the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ financial institution and the 𝑘𝑡ℎfirm based on 
the credit amount. 𝐶𝐹𝑘 represents the total amount of loans the 𝑘
𝑡ℎ firm has received. Without 
loss of generality, we assume that there is nonexistence of multiple feedback loops. This is to say, 
when the risk of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ financial institution is spread to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ firm, and the risk is spread back 
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by Nationally-operated Institutions (2000-2014)
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to the 𝑖𝑡ℎ financial firm according to formula (10), the risk would not be spread to the 𝑘𝑡ℎ firm 
for the second time. Then, in accordance with formula (9), (10) and (11), when the 𝑖𝑡ℎ financial 
institution went bankrupt in t period (𝛾𝐵𝑖
𝑡 = 1), the weighted risk index of all the financial 
institutions and firms in the network in t+1 period is as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐵 =
∑ 𝐶𝐵𝑖 ∙ 𝛾𝐵𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝐶𝐵𝑖𝑖
，  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐹 =
∑ 𝐶𝐹𝑘 ∙ 𝛾𝐹𝑘𝑘
∑ 𝐶𝐹𝑘𝑘
 
The CRS (credit risk score) of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ financial institution is defined as the sum of 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐵 and 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝐹. Similarly, we got the CRS for the 𝑘
𝑡ℎ firm. Different from several widely-used algorithm 
such as Pagerank, HITS, the CRS involves the interactive mechanism among the two kinds of 
vertex in the bipartite network simultaneously. In addition, The initial shock (𝛾𝐵𝑖
𝑡+1) to the whole 
system can be optimized according to the natures or conditions of the entities with high degree of 
flexibility, such that it could be set much higher in the situation of small-sized financial 
institutions than those of the large state-owned ones.  
 
Figure 13 presents the simulation results of CRS for both financial institutions and firms from 
2000 to 2014. From 2000 to 2014, the CRS generally followed an increasing trend. From 2000 to 
2006, the CRS was less volatile and remained at a low level. From 2007 to 2010, the CRS 
gradually increased but still at contronable level. From 2011 to 2014, the CRS grew rapidly, and 
the average annual growth of fianancial institutions and firms reached 98.07% and 48.40% 
respectively. This swift increase may be largely due to the outbreak of the glocal economic crisis 
in 2008. In order to avoid further slowdown in China's economic growth rate, the Chinese 
government lauched massive economic and monetary stimulus packages. While the credit quota 
increased enormously, the qualification requirement by financial institutions of lending firms also 
decresed gradually, leading to a rapid growth of the overal CRS during this period.  
Table 3  The Top Ranking of CRS of Financial Institutions 
Year Financial Institutions Type of Financial Institutions CRS 
2000 China Construction Bank State-owned commercial bank 54.31 
2001 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank nationwide joint-stock bank 58.00 
2002 China Construction Bank State-owned commercial bank 97.78 
2003 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank nationwide joint-stock bank 97.10 
2004 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China State-owned commercial bank 591.96 
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Figure 13  The Trend of Credit Risk Score (CRS) (2000-2014)
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2005 China Development Bank Policy bank 62.70 
2006 The Export-Import Bank of China Policy bank 45.42 
2007 China Everbright Bank Nationwide joint-stock bank 119.37 
2008 Hengfeng Bank Nationwide joint-stock bank 248.06 
2009 China Eastern Airlines Financial Service Company Trust and financial firm 278.50 
2010 Bank of Kunlun 
Urban commercial bank and 
urban credit cooperatives 
553.62 
2011 The Export-Import Bank of China Policy bank 139.02 
2012 Changji Rural Commercial Bank 
Rural cooperative bank and rural 
credit cooperatives 
292.98 
2013 China Resources Bank of Zhuhai 
Urban commercial bank and 
urban credit cooperatives 
861.41 
2014 Tsingtao Brewery Finance Company Trust and financial firm 1410.35 
 
Table 4  The Top Ranking of CRS of Firms 
Year Firms Industry of Firms CRS 
2000 Beijing Centergate Technologies Co., Ltd Real estate development and operation 160.00 
2001 Financial Street Holding Co., Ltd Real estate development and operation 132.93 
2002 Shanghai Fosun Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Medicine manufacturing 428.83 
2003 Beijing Gehua Catv Network Co., Ltd Information dissemination service 1043.48 
2004 Shanxi Zhangze Electric Power Co., Ltd 
Electric power, steam and hot water 
production and supply 
1592.47 
2005 Tongfang Co., Ltd Computer application service 422.22 
2006 Zhongmin Energy Co., Ltd. Paper making and paper products 237.50 
2007 Huayu Automotive Systems Company Limited Traffic equipment manufacturing 269.20 
2008 Zhejiang China Commodities City Co., Ltd. Comprehensive 756.67 
2009 China Eastern Airlines Co., Ltd. Air transport 555.00 
2010 China Xd Electric Co., Ltd 
Electric power, steam and hot water 
production and supply 
2381.62 
2011 
Shanxi Lu’An Environmental Energy 
Development Co.,Ltd. 
Coal mining and dressing 788.00 
2012 
Elion Clean Energy Company Limited 
Chemical material and products 
manufacturing 
648.51 
2013 ZTE Corporation 
Communications and related equipment 
manufacturing 
4005.28 
2014 Tsingtao Brewery Co., Ltd. Beverage manufacturing 2818.70 
 
Table 3 and 4 listed the specific financial institutions and firms with the highest CRS in each year 
from 2000 to 2014. Firstly, the progressive increasing trend of the highest CRS values of financial 
institutions and firms both followed by an exponential growth model with the parameter equaling 
to 0.180 (p<0.005) and 0.158 (p<0.005). This implied that systematic risks were rapidly 
accumulated with the substantial expansion of credit since 2010. Secondly, the types of the 
financial institutions with the highest CRS and the industries of the firms with the highest CRS 
were much diverse than we expected, especially compared with the most representative ones in 
the largest communities as we discussed in section 3.3. The possible explanation is that CRS 
calculation takes account of the interactions of the vertex with other vertices in the network, while 
the most representative financial institution type or industry type was identified by amount of 
credits without considering interactions. For effective supervision of systematic risk, both the 
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amount of credits and the interconnected nature of creditors and debtors from the network 
prospective should be considered. The community analysis and CRS analysis complement with 
each other to offer a comprehensive picture for effective systematic risk control.  
Table 5  The Top Ranking of CRS by Types of Financial Institutions and Industries of Firms 
(2000-2014) 
Year Type of Financial Institutions CRS Industry of Firms CRS 
2000 State-owned commercial banks 13.71 
Real estate development and 
operation 
23.88 
2001 
Urban commercial bank and 
urban credit cooperatives 
30.63 Beverage manufacturing 27.31 
2002 State-owned commercial banks 33.16 
Electric power, steam and hot 
water production and supply 
38.30 
2003 State-owned commercial banks 22.28 Information dissemination service 1043.48 
2004 State-owned commercial banks 144.20 
Electric power, steam and hot 
water production and supply 
150.29 
2005 Policy bank 33.90 Computer application service 211.15 
2006 Policy bank 35.89 Paper making and paper products 130.75 
2007 Nationwide joint-stock banks 27.10 Traffic equipment manufacturing 104.15 
2008 State-owned commercial banks 75.69 Broadcasting, movie and television 102.64 
2009 Foreign bank 35.06 Air transport 191.37 
2010 Nationwide joint-stock banks 128.98 Cement manufacturing 1105.25 
2011 Policy bank 73.36 Cement manufacturing 209.01 
2012 State-owned commercial banks 53.89 Cement manufacturing 583.96 
2013 State-owned commercial banks 210.83 Cement manufacturing 281.57 
2014 Policy bank 158.43 Leasing service 398.27 
 
 
Table 5 listed the type of financial institutions and the industry of firms with the highest average 
CRS in each year. For financial institutions, the ones with relatively high CRS were state-owned 
commercial banks, policy banks and nationwide joint-stock banks, which implied the crucial roles 
these banks played in the stability of China's financial system. For firms, the CRS of 
manufacturing industries were at high level, indicating that the manufacturing industries were still 
the pillar industries of the Chinese national economy. Figure 14 shows the CRS trend of financial 
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institutions for 15 years. The CRS generally followed a rising trend. For state-owned commercial 
banks, policy banks and nationwide joint-stock banks, their CRS increased more significantly after 
2007. However, for urban commercial bank and urban credit cooperatives, rural commercial bank 
and rural credit cooperatives, and trust and financial firms, the growth trend was relatively stable. 
In addition, the CRS of state-owned commercial banks was cyclical to some extent. This showed 
that, apart from the common functions of commercial banks, state-owned commercial banks also 
played a role in adjusting economic cycles for historical or political reasons, partly leading to high 
credit risk and large amount of non-performing assets for many years. On the whole, the average 
annual skewness of CRS was 3.71 and 9.094 for financial firms and firms respectively. The 
distribution of CRS was right skewed significantly. It means that the majority of entities had very 
limited influence on the systematic stability and only a small amount of financial firms would 
have substantial impact on the entire credit system if defaults.  
It is also meaningful to investigate the effect of the topological properties of the vertices on the 
CRS, which shed the light on the determinants of the systematic risk at micro level from the 
network prospective. Besides the degree and strength mentioned in the previous sections, two 
network metrics are further introduced from a supplementary perspective. Firstly, in the networks, 
the greater the number of paths in which a vertex participates, the higher the importance of this 
vertex for the network. Thus, assuming that the interactions following the shortest paths between 
two vertices, the betweenness of the focal vertex is defined to quantify the importance of a vertex 
as (Costa et al., 2007): 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑘 = ∑
𝜎(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑗)
𝜎(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑖𝑗
 
Here, 𝜎(𝑖, 𝑘, 𝑗) is the number of shortest paths between vertex 𝑖 and 𝑗 that pass through the 
focal vertex 𝑘. 𝜎(𝑖, 𝑗) is the total number of shortest paths between 𝑖 and 𝑗, and the sum is over 
all pairs 𝑖, 𝑗 of distinct vertices.  
Secondly, the average relative distance of each vertex from any other nodes in the network can be 
calculated as: 
?̅?𝑖 = 𝑁
−1 ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
By definition, the smaller the d̅i is, the closer the vertex is to any other nodes, and the more 
center the vertex is located. The closeness of the focal vertex is defined as the reciprocal of this 
kind of relative distance as follows: 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖 = 𝑁 ∙ (∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
)
−1
 
In the context of financial institution and firm credit network, the betweenness measures the 
probability of the vertex serving as the bridge to spread the systematic risk, the closeness 
measures how fast the vertex could spread the systematic risk to other vertices in the network.  
The analysis was conducted by estimating a fixed-effect panel specification while controlling time 
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effect to explore the relationship between CRS and topological properties at vertex-level. The 
results (see Table 6 and Table 7) indicated that the degree and strength of the vertices exerted a 
positive impact on the CRS. It meant that the potential systematic risk originated from the vertex 
was associated with increasing access of the entities to the credit markets. Counterintuitively, the 
betweenness demonstrated an inverse relationship, implying the systematic risk was less likely to 
accumulate in the intermediate vertex during the risk proliferation. The possible reason was that 
the large amount of the shortest path through these bridge-like vertices could somehow disperse 
the embedded system risk to other vertices in the network. However, no significant relationship 
was found between the CRS and vertex-level closeness. Furthermore, the lagging effect of the 
topological properties measured by degree and strength was introduced to the analysis. The results 
revealed that only the strength of the vertex exerted first-order lagging effect to the CRS. Finally, 
it was to determine how periods of financial crisis moderate the relationship between topological 
properties of the vertices and their CRS. We refit the above model using the data after 2009①. The 
main conclusions drawn above were still unchanged, while the impact made by vertex degree was 
almost tripled escalated from 0.33912 to 0.9455. In addition, no significant lagging effect of were 
found. This might be caused by the dramatically-changed economic environments during the 
period captured by the time effect. 
Table 6  The Relationships between CRS and Topological Properties of Vertex (Financial Institutions) 
 Dependent: 𝑪𝑹𝑹𝑩𝒊 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Degree 
0.2709* 
(2.3252) 
0.3391*** 
(3.5917) 
0.9455** 
(3.1814) 
Strength 
0.00107*** 
(3.8231) 
0.00112*** 
(3.6524) 
0.00080** 
(2.9102) 
Betweenness 
-0.0008** 
(-2.886) 
-0.0008** 
(-2.8143) 
-0.0010** 
(-3.0256) 
Closeness 
-136970 
(-0.5447) 
-80268 
(-0.2606) 
-12324000* 
(-2.1701) 
Degree_Lag - 
0.0561 
(0.2341) 
-0.64425 
(-1.9146) 
Strength_Lag - 
-0.00098** 
(-2.985) 
-0.00071 
(-1.9012) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,810 1,012 754 
Adj. R-Squared 0.1669 0.2029 0.301 
 
Table 7  The Relationships between CRS and Topological Properties of Vertex (Firms) 
 Dependent: 𝑪𝑹𝑹𝑭𝒊 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Degree 
2.1797*** 
(9.7317) 
2.9106*** 
(12.6211) 
2.9262*** 
（10.5957） 
Strength 
0.01003*** 
(27.9718) 
0.00496*** 
(14.069) 
0.00514*** 
（12.8587） 
                                                             
① The date of the four trillion yuan ($586 billion) stimulus package against the global financial crisis was unveiled 
at the later November in 2008. Therefore, we decided to use the data from 2009 to 2014 in order for data 
consistency. 
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Betweenness 
-0.00031* 
(-2.4717) 
-0.00035* 
(-2.2422） 
-0.00034* 
（-1.9692） 
Closeness 
-55211 
(-0.1749) 
-158570 
（-0.3125） 
-1633300 
（-0.3655) 
Degree_Lag - 
-0.1375 
（-0.507） 
-0.08416 
(-0.2616) 
Strength_Lag - 
0.00105*** 
（3.8812） 
0.00103*** 
(3.4205) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes 
N 5,383 2,668 1,998 
Adj. R-Squared 0.2271 0.3374 0.3453 
 
5.2 Immune Effectiveness Analysis of the CRS 
The financial risk regulatory mechanism based on Basel agreement usually regards the capital 
requirements as the core indicator of the financial sector regulation. However, the above CRS 
analysis suggests that each entity in the credit system exerts significantly different influence on 
systematic stability. Therefore, it is not sufficient to supervise all the financial institutions with 
only one type of indicators, such as reserve and capital adequacy ratio, and with the same standard. 
The financial risk transmission mechanism in the credit network should not be ignored. One 
effective way proposed by this study is to calculate the CRS of each entity in the credit market, 
and to take stringent regulatory measures towards the entities with high CRS, which would 
allocate regulatory resources more efficiently. 
This section draws on the transmission theory of infectious diseases. Through the comparison of 
influences exerted by different types of risks on system stability, it is to verify the effectiveness of 
the suggested CRS method. In complex network, the network stability refers to the network 
connectivity after deletion of certain vertices and edges (Albert et al., 2000). In our study, we 
measures the system stability by deleting certain vertices, which simulates that certain entities 
defaults and go bankrupt after some shocks in the credit system. Four indexes were selected to 
measure the connectivity of the network: 1) Scale of the largest connected subgraph, SLCS; 2) 
Number of Communities, NC; 3) Graph Density, GD; 4) Average Path Length，APL. At the initial 
stage, the network connectivity was at the best status, with the large SLCS, large GD, few NC and 
short APL. While the network was attacked continuously, the network was dispersed into subsets. 
The network connectivity got worse, with smaller SLCS and GD and larger NC and APL. 
Referring to the method used by Crucitti et al. (2013), this study used selective attack and random 
attack to delete vertices. For the former method, vertices would be deleted according to the risk 
conditions, from vertices with high CRS to vertices with low CRS. If the CRS is good 
measurement of a vertex's systematic risk, the system stability would be damaged to the largest 
extent in the case of selective attack. 
Table 8  The Change of Network Connectivity under Two Attack Strategies 
 SLCS NC GD APL 
 Financial Institutions 
CRS 4.080% -68.552% 3.576% -7.440% 
Random 1.871% -0.110% 1.713% -2.525% 
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 Firms 
CRS 0.466% -0.185% 0.173% -0.239% 
Random 0.192% -0.001% 0.066% 0.036% 
As it can be seen from table 8①, compared with random attack, the network was damaged to the 
largest extent in the case of selective attack. In this scenario, both SLCS and GD decreased fast, 
and NC and APL increased fast. The analysis suggested that the Chinese credit system had 
relatively high stability in the case of random attacks, while it had relatively low stability in the 
case of selective attacks. It also implied that the CRS is good measurement of an entity's 
systematic risk in the credit network. 
 
6.  Conclusions and Policy Suggestions 
This paper investigates China's credit market by drawing the credit data between listed firms in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets and financial institutions for 15 years from CSMAR 
database. By viewing the China's credit market as an interdependent bipartite network on actual 
financial transaction data, the financial institution-firm network and its projected sub-networks 
were constructed using the theory of complex network, whose topological properties were 
analyzed in details. In addition, credit risk score (CRS), a network-based measurement, was 
introduced to measure the potential systematic risk embedded in a financial institution or a firm, 
providing new insights on the risk control from a network perspective. 
Firstly, we measured some topological properties of the financial institution-firm network such as 
degree, strength and relative strength distribution, and the community structure and its 
membership. We found that the financial institution-firm network was a typical scale-free network, 
and both degree and strength featuring significant heterogeneity witnessed a gradual upward due 
to the national credit expansion during the last fifteen years. From the analysis of community 
structure, it was found that the state-owned commercial banks played a dominant role in the credit 
market almost throughout the whole time period, while the prominent industry changed from time 
to time. The financial institutions and firms were highly connected as captured by the community 
structure and they were asymmetrically connected, as captured by the degree and strength 
distribution. It implied that the local idiosyncratic shocks such as default risk were possible to 
proliferate through the whole economy and generate a sizable global disturbance. 
Next, we focused on the topological properties of the two projected credit sub-networks with only 
one-mode data (financial institution or firm), finding that both the institution-institution and 
firm-firm network demonstrated the characteristics of disassortativity. It suggested that the 
temporal distribution of credit was remarkable asymmetric and was still dominated by large 
state-owned financial institutions, leaving a long-standing credit market with firms highly 
competitive for financial resources. 
Finally, the credit risk score (CRS) was introduced by simulation to identify the systematically 
important vertices in terms of systematic risk control. The increasing CRS at the network and 
vertex level implies that systematic risks were rapidly accumulated with the substantial expansion 
of credit, especially after the launch of massive economic and monetary stimulus packages since 
                                                             
① The benchmark of the changes in table 8 was the measurement of network connectivity before the attack. 
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2009. Meanwhile, the relationship between a vertex's typological properties and its CRS was 
analyzed. It indicated that the more access an entity had to the credit market, the higher CRS the 
vertex had. The more bridge-like an vertex was, which was measured by betweenness, it was more 
likely that it could disperse the embedded systematic risk to other vertices, and therefore it had 
smaller CRS. At last, by comparing the stability of the credit network under the different attack 
strategies, the effectiveness of CRS was verified. 
Policy suggestions were proposed in accordance with the above findings. As we discussed in 
section 5, the systematically important vertices with higher CRS should be paid close attention in 
the macro-prudential supervision. Based on this idea, two regulatory strategies are recommended. 
One is to set the minimal capital requirement on the entity. The reserve capital of the financial 
institutions and firms with high credit risk score should be no less than a critical threshold of their 
credit exposures: 
𝑐?̅?𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎 𝑥(𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝜃𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1)) 
Where 𝑐?̅?𝑡 and 𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1) are the reserve capital of 𝑖
𝑡ℎ entity at the t and t-1 period, and 𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1) is 
its credit exposures at t-1 period. The rates of provisions for reserve capital (𝜃𝑖𝑡) need to be timely 
adjusted by supervisions to ensure that the reserve capital of 𝑖𝑡ℎ entity meet the requirements. 
The second strategy is to set the minimum capital-risk exposure ratio. In accordance with the 
strength of edges in the credit network, for each financial institution and firm, set the reserve 
capital requirement based on its largest weighted credit. More specifically,  
𝑐?̅?𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎 𝑥(𝑐𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗|𝑖≠𝑖(𝐸𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1)) 𝜃𝑖𝑡⁄ ) 
Where 𝐸𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1) is the strength of edge based on credit amount between entity i and entity j. The 
above two regulatory strategies adopted the perspectives from vertices and edges, taking account 
of the impact of heterogeneity on financial risk transmission path and scope.  
The second suggestion is to leverage the modularity of the credit network for better stability of the 
credit system. By cutting the credit network into independent sub networks (hierarchy modules), it 
would cut down the risk transmission path, helping decrease the diffusion speed of systematic 
risks. This suggestion is consistent with the ‘ring-fence principle’ proposed in the Volcker Rule 
adopted in U.S. in 2014, and with similar accords in the UK and Europe, such as Vickers Report. 
The ring-fence separates the business of commercial banks from other businesses, preventing the 
spread of high risk business to traditional business. Differentiate the entities with different impacts 
on financial stability and expose different supervision standard accordingly. Network modeling 
and analysis would be of good use for this distinction. It is also important to reduce complexity 
and increase transparency of financial systems to guard against systemic and regional financial 
risks. 
The last suggestion is to optimize the market allocation of credit resources to better serve the real 
economy. This suggestions is particularly for emerging countries. The financial service sector 
needs to be more competitive and inclusive. In boosting financial market competition and easing 
market access, the development of small financial institutions should be supported to enrich 
competitive offers of financial resources. In addition, the compensation mechanism of credit risk 
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for small and micro firms and financial institution-firm cooperation platform should be established 
to motivate financial institutions to serve small and micro firms, resolving their financial 
difficulties. Besides, formulate different supervision standards for rural financial risks. Under 
controllable risk, policy-oriented financial resources should be guided to increase the support the 
development of rural areas, with reference to other countries’ prior experience.  
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